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Abstract 
Background and Objectives: Rumination following an event, particularly in an abstract as 
opposed to concrete processing mode, is associated with increased intrusive memory 
frequency. However, the temporal trajectory of intrusive memories following abstract and 
concrete rumination remains unclear. We examined the association between processing mode 
and the frequency of intrusive memories over a six-hour time period following a negative 
mood induction.  
Methods: One hundred and sixteen community participants watched a video sequence 
designed to induce negative mood. Participants were then randomised into condition 
(abstract, concrete or distraction) and completed a verbally mediated task designed to induce 
the respective processing mode. Participants then completed hourly ratings of rumination and 
intrusive memories about the video after leaving the laboratory.  
Results: Negative mood and intrusive memories were reliably induced. There were no 
differences in the frequency of intrusive memories between the abstract and concrete 
conditions. In contrast, participants in the distraction condition reported significantly more 
sensory intrusive memories than either ruminative condition. Three classes were found 
among participants following the video (intrusion free, rapid remitters, slow remitters). 
Condition was not predictive of class membership.  
Limitations: It cannot be ruled out that the differences between rumination and distraction 
conditions were due to task differences.  
Conclusions: In contrast to previous findings, our results suggest that any form of rumination 
about an event (whether in an abstract or concrete mode) may temporarily result in fewer 
intrusive memories in comparison to distraction. Processing mode does not appear to predict 
particular trajectories of intrusions following a mood induction.  
Keywords: rumination, processing mode, abstract, concrete, intrusive memory, depression 
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Introduction 
Intrusive memories (intrusions) are defined as the involuntary and spontaneous recollection of an 
autobiographical event (Brewin, Christodoulides & Hutchinson, 1996). Intrusions are a diagnostic feature of 
PTSD and have been extensively studied in this disorder (McNally, 2006). Considerable overlap has been 
found in the prevalence and characteristics of intrusive memories in depression and PTSD (Newby and 
Moulds, 2011) suggesting that intrusions may play an equally significant role in depression. Yet there has 
been sparse research conducted in this area, with no existing theoretical models which account for the role of 
intrusive memories in depression. Furthermore, intrusive memories in PTSD and depression differ in key 
features, namely their content and conditions of encoding (Krans, Pearson, Maier & Moulds, 2016).Unlike 
in PTSD, the events featured in intrusive memories in depression are not exclusively traumatic or fear based 
and can be provoked by a broader range of experiences. For example, an individual with depression may 
experience intrusive memories related to a relationship breakdown or work and/or financial difficulties.  
These differences highlight the need to investigate the unique mechanisms involved in the development and 
maintenance of intrusive memories in depression.  
One key mechanism found to be associated with intrusive memories following emotional events is 
rumination. Cumulative results from cross-sectional, analogue and clinical studies have found that 
rumination following a sad or traumatic event results in greater emotional reactivity, as well as increased 
frequency of intrusive memories in comparison to no rumination (Zetsche, Ehring and Ehlers, 2009; Kubota, 
Nixon and Chen, 2015; Kvavilashvili& Schlagman, 2011). These findings suggest that verbal processing 
about an emotional event (in the form of rumination) may trigger intrusive memories about that event, which 
may prolong emotional distress and worsen depression and PTSD symptoms.   
Yet while some studies show a strong relationship between rumination and intrusive memories, 
overall the evidence is mixed, with some studies showing no such relationship (Ehring, Szeimies and 
Schaffrick, 2009; Marks, Franklin & Zoellner, 2018). Processing Mode Theory (PMT; Watkins & Teasdale, 
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2004) provides an explanation for this discrepancy by attributing the maladaptive function of rumination to 
the processing style, rather than content of thoughts. PMT proposes that information can be processed in 
rumination through two distinct modes, abstract analytic (AA) or concrete experiential (CE). The concrete 
experiential (CE) mode consists of re-experiencing the sensory features of a memory including one’s 
emotional state and physical sensations. In contrast, the abstract analytic mode (AA) implies conceptually 
thinking about a situation based on its general causes, consequences and importance.  Thus it is possible that 
discrepant findings could be attributed to differences in processing modes adopted by participants in 
previous studies. 
Emerging experimental studies have found the AA processing mode maladaptive as it leads to 
increased intrusive memory formation, in comparison to the CE mode. White & Wild (2016) examined the 
influence of abstract or concrete processing mode on intrusive memories following an analogue trauma. 
They found that participants in the concrete condition reported significantly less emotional reactivity to the 
film clips, fewer intrusive memories, and had significantly lower Impact of Event Scale – Revised (IES-R; 
Weiss & Marmar, 1996) scores than those in the abstract condition, despite controlling for changes in affect.  
Furthermore, Watkins (2004) manipulated participants processing mode following a failure task 
designed to induce negative mood. Participants in the abstract condition reported significantly more IES-R 
intrusions and avoidance scores than participants in the concrete condition. These findings suggest that the 
mode of processing during rumination, as opposed to rumination per se, may be causally related to the 
development of intrusive memories following analogue traumatic or negative event.  
In addition to the mode of processing, the degree to which intrusions are sensory based may also be 
of clinical importance. Intrusions experienced with heightened sensory features, as opposed to thought-based 
intrusions, predominate in clinical presentations and are thought to reflect that successful emotional 
processing of an event has not taken place (Williams & Moulds, 2010). There is a need to further understand 
how processing modes, such as AA and CE ruminative styles, relate to sensory based intrusions in 
particular.  
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There also remains a lack of clarity regarding the trajectories of intrusions following emotional 
events. There is significant variability in the timeframe that intrusive memories are assessed across studies, 
from 5-minute periods following experimental procedures (Ehring et al., 2009) to up to 3 months 
(Sundermann Hauschildt, & Ehlers, 2013). Given that intrusions are a common response to emotional 
stimuli which naturally subside in healthy individuals (Galatzer-Levy, Brown, Henn-Haase et al., 2013) – 
often within hours (Brewin, 2010) – there is a need to better understand the course of intrusions following 
such tasks and especially, whether the trajectory of decline differs according to the adopted mode of 
processing. This is particularly important for understanding clinical presentations where intrusions tend to 
persist over time (Marks, Franklin & Zoellner, 2018).  
In contrast to examining the frequency of intrusions at a single timepoint in the minutes following an 
analogue distressing event, examining the trajectory of intrusions at multiple time points, their sensory and 
verbal characteristics, and factors that influence their persistence over time, may be more relevant when 
making inferences with respect to intrusions following real-world events. Conceivably, there might be two 
classes of individuals so far as the trajectory of intrusions is concerned: people at a low-level of risk for 
clinical disorders, for whom intrusions subside in the first few hours following an emotional event, and 
people at risk of clinical disorders, for whom intrusions persist.  
A further question pertains to the interaction of processing mode and persistence of intrusions. An 
abstract processing mode may be associated with a persistently high course of intrusions in the hours 
following an emotional event in contrast to concrete processing. However, to the best of our knowledge, this 
has not been subject to systematic investigation. Moreover, the experimental literature on intrusive 
memories has largely assessed the occurrence of intrusive memories in a laboratory (e.g. Holmes & Bourne, 
2008). Therefore, there is a need to examine intrusive memories using methods with greater ecological 
validity such as experience sampling. This may assist in more accurately understanding the factors that 
influence recovery or persistence of intrusive memories in real-world settings.  
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The aim of the present study was to examine whether the trajectory of intrusive memories differs 
between abstract or concrete ruminative processing mode, and a distraction control condition, over six hours 
following exposure to a negative mood induction.  Our first hypothesis was that participants in an abstract 
processing condition would report more intrusive memories in total for the duration of the study compared 
to the participants in a concrete processing condition. Our second hypothesis was purely exploratory, where 
the influence of ruminative processing mode and other variables on the trajectory of intrusive memories 
would be examined across a 6-hour time period, following exposure to a negative mood induction.  
Materials and Methods 
This study was approved by the Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel at the University of 
Technology Sydney (approval no: ETH17-1481) and the hypotheses and analyses of the present study are 
subsumed within a broader study pre-registration with the Open Science Framework (osf.io/fc83w) on 
October 4, 2017. We note that our analysis approach has necessarily deviated in places from the pre-
registered plan. Please see Supplementary Material 1 for a summary of where changes were made. 
Participants  
Participants (N=123) were recruited from the community via posters and online advertisements and 
phone screened for eligibility. Three were excluded (incompatible phone: n = 2, insufficient English: n = 1). 
The remaining 120 participants were invited to participate in the study and randomly allocated via an online 
randomisation generator (www.randomizer.org) into the abstract (n = 40), concrete (n = 40), or distraction 
condition (n = 40). Participants were reimbursed via a $30 online gift card.  
Measures 
Demographic variables were assessed via nine self-report items created for the present study. 
Questions pertained to participants' age, gender, relationship and socio- economic status, as well as history 
of diagnosed mental health condition. Please see supplementary materials 4 for the items of this 
questionnaire.  
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The Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9; Spitzer, Williams & Kroenke, 2001) is a nine-item 
scale which measures depression symptoms. Items are rated on a 0 to 3 scale (where 0 = not at all, 3 = 
nearly every day) and are summed to provide a total score ranging from 0 – 27, with scores of 5, 10, 15 and 
20 representing mild, moderate, moderately severe and severe depression, respectively. The PHQ-9 has been 
found to have good criterion validity, construct validity, external validity and internal reliability with a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89 (Kroenke et al., 2001).  
The Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist-5 (PCL-5; Weathers, Litz, Keane, Palmieri, Marx & 
Schnurr, 2013) is a 20-item scale which assesses the 20 DSM-5 symptoms of PTSD. Responses range from 
0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely) and are summed to provide a total score ranging from 0 – 80. Items of the 
PCL-5 are aligned with the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) diagnostic criteria for PTSD. 
The PCL-5 was only administered to participants who endorsed a traumatic experience. We created a proxy 
diagnosis for PTSD based on the DSM-5 criteria from which analyses were derived. The PCL-5 has strong 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α= .94) and test-retest reliability (r =.82; Blevins et al., 2015).  
The Patient-Reported Outcomes Measurement Information System Emotional Distress – Anxiety – 
Short Form (PROMIS; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) is a seven-item scale which assesses 
symptoms of anxiety. Responses range from one (never) to five (always) and are summed, with a score of 
16, 20, and 28 indicating mild, moderate, and severe anxiety, respectively. The PROMIS has excellent 
internal consistency and a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.93 (Pilkonis et al., 2011).  
Rumination was assessed using the Action and Control Scale – Preoccupation Subscale (ACS-90, 
Kuhl, 1994). Participants were presented with 12 scenarios and were required to select either a ruminative 
response (e.g. “The thought that I lost keeps running through my mind”, scored 1), or a non-ruminative 
response (e.g. “I can soon put losing out of my mind”, cored 0), yielding an overall score from 0 (no 
preoccupation) to 12 (extreme rumination). The subscale has good reliability (Kuhl, 1994) and validity 
(Rholes et a., 1989). This scale was chosen as it is thought to measure rumination independent of processing 
mode, unlike other ruminative questionnaires (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).  
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Worry was assessed using the 16-item Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). Each item is rated on a five-point scale from one (not at all typical of me) to 
five (very typical of me). A total score is calculated by summing the first 11 items and the reverse-scores of 
the latter 5 items, with higher PSWQ scores reflecting greater levels of pathological worry. The PSWQ has 
high internal consistency and good test-retest reliability, with a Chronbach’s alpha of .93 (Meyer et al., 
1990). 
A 16-item questionnaire titled ‘Rumination and Intrusive Memory Questionnaire’ was created for the 
present study and used to assess for the occurrence of intrusive memories and rumination following 
exposure to the sad film. This questionnaire contained items adapted from the Intrusive Memory Interview 
(IMI; Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckman & Clark, 2004) and Ruminative Response Style Questionnaire (RRS; 
Treynor, Gonzalez & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Participants were asked whether or not they experienced an 
intrusive memory and asked to describe the memory in a single sentence. Participants also rated 
characteristics of the intrusive memory, including whether it was experienced as predominantly sensory or 
verbal. The results of analyses regarding the characteristics and qualitative features of the intrusive 
memories are beyond the scope of the current paper and will be reported elsewhere. Additionally, three 
items of the questionnaire pertained to whether participants ruminated about the memory and were rated on 
a scale of 0 (not at all) to 100 (very true). Higher scores indicated greater levels of rumination. The test-
retest reliability of IMI has been found to range from r = .61 to r = .72 (Hackmann et al., 2004) and the RRS 
has been found to have acceptable construct validity and reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha of .83 (Parola, 
Zendjidjian, Alessandrini et al., 2017).  
Procedure  
Please see Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of the study procedure. Participants provided informed 
consent and were then directed to complete self-report measures. Participants also provided ratings of their 
mood (sadness, happiness and calmness) on a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS; range 0-100) as a mood 
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induction check at four timepoints throughout the course of the study (immediately before and after the film 
clip, after the processing mode manipulation or distraction task, and after the self-rating questions) .  
 
 
Negative Mood induction  
Participants then watched a 5-minute video sequence taken from the 2008 film ‘The Boy in the 
Striped Pyjamas’ directed by Mark Herman (Miramax). The video depicts the death of a boy while his 
parents attempt to save him. This mood induction is similar to the commonly used ‘trauma-film paradigm’ 
(Holmes and Bourne, 2008) with the exception that the film clip was designed to elicit sad mood rather than 
a fear or stress based reaction. As such, in contrast to traumatic material used in the trauma-film paradigm, 
the current film clip contained no violent or graphic scenes. Additionally,  this clip has been found to 
reliably induce sad mood, in contrast to a fear or stress reaction (Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot, 
2010).  
Processing Mode Induction  
Participants were then instructed to write an essay for 15 minutes about the scene they had watched 
in either an abstract or concrete manner. The instructions for the abstract condition were ‘Please  write  about 
the general causes  and  the general consequences  of the event  in the film. Write  about  what this event 
means about the world and the people in  the film clip’. In contrast, the instructions for the concrete 
Figure 1. Study Procedure 
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condition were ‘Please write  about the moment-to-moment experience of watching the film clip. Write 
about the emotions, thoughts and physical sensations you experienced while watching the film  clip’. These 
instructions were very similar to the processing mode induction used by Watkins and Teasdale (2004) and 
Williams and Moulds (2007) and were chosen as they differentiate the conditions based on their experiential 
awareness on sensory information which is the variable proposed distinguish the modes of processing and 
determine whether successful emotional processing occurs (Teasdale, 1999).  
Participants in the distraction condition were administered 28 distraction statements of the standard 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) distraction induction. The instructions for this condition were ‘For the 
next few minutes, try your best to focus your attention on each of the ideas on the following pages.   Read 
each item slowly and silently to yourself. As you read the items, use your imagination and concentration to 
focus your mind on each of the ideas. Spend a few moments visualising and concentrating on each item  
(please see Supplementary Materials 2 for the items of the distraction condition).  
The experimenter and an independent rater, blind to condition assignment, coded essays for causal 
and sensory words, to obtain a measure of inter-rater reliability. There was a 93% agreement between the 
coders as to the assigned processing mode of participants. Discrepancies were resolved through discussion. 
The results of the interrater analysis are κ= 0.218,  p < 0.001 (95% CI 3.77, 8.23) indicating fair agreement 
(Landis & Koch, 1977). Participants were then provided with definitions of abstract and concrete processing 
and were asked to self-rate the extent to which their thinking about the film clip could be was consistent 
with each processing style on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).   
Experience Sampling  
Participants then downloaded the Metricwire mobile app (www.metricwire.com) and then left the 
laboratory. They then received a notification on their smartphone every hour for a period of six hours, 
directing them to complete the ‘Rumination and Intrusive Memory Questionnaire’ on the Metricwire app 
which assessed for the presence and frequency of intrusive memories and rumination about the film clip 
over the past hour. Please see the items of this questionnaire below:  
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Rumination and Intrusive Memory Questionnaire  
1. In the past 30 minutes, have you experienced any spontaneous memories of the film clip from 
‘The Boy in the Striped Pyjamas’, [yes/no with the following questions contingent on a “yes” 
response]  
2. How many times did you experience this type of memory?   
3. In a single sentence, describe what you remembered.   
4. How long did the memory last?   
5. How distressing did you find the memory?   
6. When you experienced this memory, how uncontrollable was it?   
7. How much did the memory interfere with what you were doing at the time?   
8. Was the experience of the memory more like a thought or a sensory experience (i.e. contain any 
visual, olfactory, tactile component)? 
9. Was the memory from a first-person or observer’s visual perspective?  
10. How vivid was the memory?  
11. When you experienced the memory, how much did it feel like it was happening now compared to 
happening in the past?   
12. To what extent did you feel the following emotions during the memory: sad (0 = not at all, 100 = 
very much) happy (0 = not at all, 100 = very much)   
13. I find that my mind goes over the film clip again and again (0 = not at all – 100 = very true) 
14. I find that thoughts about the film clip come to my mind over and over throughout the day (0 = 
not at all – 100 = very true)  
15. I can’t stop thinking about the film clip (0 = not at all – 100 = very true) 
Data Screening and Analysis  
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Descriptive data analyses, one-way ANOVAs to identify between-condition differences in 
participant characteristics, and repeated measures t-tests to confirm that the mood induction and processing 
mode manipulations were effective, were conducted on SPSS version 25.  
To test the first hypothesis, that the participants in the abstract condition will report a greater total 
number of intrusions than participants in the concrete condition, a generalized linear model (GLM) was 
estimated to predict the total number of reported intrusions (across all post-induction assessment points). 
Given that the total number of intrusions can be considered to be a count variable, a Negative Binomial Log-
Link function was used for the analysis. We first estimated the model with processing mode entered as a 
dummy coded variable (Abstract vs other conditions and Concrete vs other conditions). Next, we re-ran the 
model by including the following key covariates: PHQ-9, PROMIS, PSWQ, ACS, and PCL-derived 
diagnosis.  
To determine whether the trajectories of intrusions differ across the assessment points, a second 
stage of the analysis involved exploration of whether latent classes of the trajectory of intrusive memory 
frequencies could be determined. Mplus version 7.31 was used for these analyses. Latent class growth 
analysis (LCGA) divides the trajectories of groups of participants into mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
classes (Collins & Lanza, 2010), which are “latent” in that class membership is not directly observed or 
measures (O’Donnell et al., 2017). The number of classes is determined partly on the basis of theory 
(parsimony being favoured) and partly on the basis of a number of fit indices. The Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC, Akaike, 1987) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, Schmartz, 1978) are goodness of 
fit indices where lower values correspond to improved model fit. The Lo-Mendell Rubin Likelihood ratio 
test (LMRLRT; Lo. Mendell, & Rubin, 2001) provides a p- value which indicates if a model fits the data 
better than a model with fewer classes (Nylund, Asparouhov, & Muthen, 2007). The entropy values, which 
indicate the classification accuracy of a solution, are also reported with values close to one indicating 
relatively stronger class classification accuracy (Geiser, 2010). 
Running head: RUMINATIVE PROCESSING MODE AND INTRUSIONS FOLLOWING A MOOD 
INDUCTION  
   11 
 
All models included an intercept and slope term, and the number of random starts was set to 1000, 
and the number of iterations to 200. Consistent with the LCGA approach, all within class variances were set 
to zero (Jun & Wickrama, 2008). Once the number of trajectory classes was determined, most likely class 
membership of each participant was regressed upon intrusion frequency.  
To determine which factors predicted the trajectory of intrusions for participants, once the number of 
trajectory classes and most likely class membership for each participant were determined through LCGA, a 
series of regression analyses were run to determine whether class membership was predicted by self-report 
measures, intrusive memory characteristics and condition.  
Results 
Sample Characteristics  
Table 1 presents demographic, sample and clinical characteristics for each group. There were no 
significant differences between groups in terms of age (F (2, 113) = 1.02, p < .05) or gender (2 = 3.02, df = 
2, p<.05).  Furthermore, there were no significant differences between groups in terms of depression (F (2, 
113) = .290, df = 2, p<.05), PTSD (F (2, 113) = .448, df = 2, p<.05), anxiety (F (2, 113) =.033, df = 2, 
p<.05), and worry (F (2, 113) = .506, df = 2, p<.05) scores. In contrast, participants in the concrete condition 
were found to have marginally higher trait rumination scores than either the abstract or distraction condition 
(F (2, 113) = 3.19, df = 2, p =.045).  
The number of participants who responded during the follow-up procedure was 115 (100%), 109 
(95%), 110 (96%), 105 (91%), 106 (92%), 100 (87%) and 110 (96%) each time point, respectively. 
Furthermore, 755 (94%) of all time points were responded to across the entire follow-up procedure.   
Mood and Processing Mode Manipulation Checks  
Mood induction check  
A paired samples t-test revealed the negative mood induction had the intended effect of reducing the 
total sample’s mood from pre to post induction ratings t (115) = -13.40, p<.001. Additionally, the mood 
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induction was found to significantly reduce happiness t (115) = 15.71, p<.001 and calmness ratings t (115_ 
= 2.14, p<.05 from pre to post induction.  
In order to evaluate whether the sad mood induction had a differential effect between condition, a 2 
(condition: abstract, concrete, distraction) x 2 (time: baseline-Time1, post-induction-Time 2) repeated 
measures ANOVA was calculated using sad mood as the dependent measure. As anticipated, there was a 
significant main effect of Time, F (2, 113) = 182.27, p<.001), revealing that participants ratings of negative 
mood significantly increased following exposure to the film clip. There were no other significant main 
effects or interactions, indicating that the response to the mood induction was similar across each of the 
processing mode induction groups (all p’s>.05). Figure 2 depicts the persistence of participant’s negative 
mood ratings throughout the course of the study.  
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of participants in abstract, concrete and distraction conditions and 
values on the self-report instrument 
 
                                 Total sample          Abstract         Concrete       Distraction         2 comparisons between 
                               of participants          condition       condition        condition          participants in abstract,  
                                (N =116)                  (n=39)           (n=37)            (n=40)              concrete and distraction 
                          condition 
 
           N   %ǂ      n      %ǂ       n      %ǂ      n     %ǂ      2          df     p-value* 
 
Gender 
    Female      72 62.1     23 59      20 54.1    29 72.5      3.02     2     .221  
Ethnicity 
    Caucasian  33 28.4     13 33.3      11 29.7    9 22.5      1.182   2     .554 
    Aboriginal  1 .9      0 0       0     0    1 2.5      1.92     2         .384 
    Asian  37 31.9     14 35.9      12 32.4    11 27.5          .648     2         .723 
    European  12 103     2 5.1        6 16.2    4 10.0      2.53     2         .283 
    Middle Eastern 4 3.4     0 0       3 8.1    1 2.5        3.91     2         .141 
    Indian  25 21.6     6 15.4       5 13.5    14 35.0      6.57     2         .037 
 
Relationship Status       
    Currently in a  
    married or defacto  
    relationship  34 29.3      16 35.9       10 26.7   7 17.5       1.89     2     .389 
Education 
High School  29 25.0       7 17.9       8    21.6  14       35.0     3.39     2     .183   
TAFE   1 6.0       2 5.1       1 2.7   4 10.0     1.89     2     .389 
Undergraduate 41 35.3       13  33.3       16  43.2   12       30.0     1.58     2     .454 
Employment 
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    Currently employed  60 51.5        25  64.1       15 40.5   20 50     4.29     2          .117 
    full-time or  
    part-time 
Diagnosed with a 26 22.4        5 12.8        9 24.3  12 30     3.47     2      1.77 
mental disorder 
    Anxiety Disorder    18 15.5        4 10.3        7 18.9   7 17.5     1.27     2       .530 
    Mood Disorder 13 11.3        4 10.3        2 5.4   5 12.5     .971     2       .615 
    Trauma Disorder 1 .9        0 0        1 2.7   0 0     2.15     2            .341 
    Eating Disorder 4 3.4              1 2.6        1 2.7   2 5.0     .443     2            .801 
    Psychotic Disorder 2 1.7        0 0        1 2.7   1 2.5     1.04     2       .596 
    Personality    
    Disorder   2 1.7        1 2.6        1 2.7   0 0     1.07     2         .585 
Sought mental health 
treatment in past 26 22.4         5 12.8         9 24.3    12 30.0     3.46     2            .177 
Currently  
Experiencing mental 
disorder  11 9.5         2 5.1         6 16.2     3 7.5     3.67      2       .159 
 
 
Total sample of    Abstract     Concrete Distraction            One-way ANOVA 
   participants        condition     condition condition 
(N=116)       (n=39)      (n=37) (n=40) 
 
Mean SD      Mean   SD     Mean  SD    Mean   SD  F df p 
              
Age   26.30 6.98      26.03    6.51      27.59  6.61     25.38  7.71 1.018 2      .365 
PHQ-9   4.95 4.18      4.67      3.19      4.81    3.96     5.35    5.17 .290 2      .749 
PCL-5   36.44 12.77      36.14    12.22    34.44  11.59   38.21  14.29  .448 2      .641 
PROMIS  16.41 5.95       16.46    5.28   16.57   6.02  16.23   6.60 .033 2      .967 
ACS   5.79 1.77       5.26      1.60    6.24    1.71      5.90    1.88 3.19 2      .045 
PSWQ   66.49 19.25       68.95    18.63  64.68  18.04    65.78  21.01 .506 2      .604 
  
# Chi-square results compare the proportions of participants who have and have not searched for health 
information online in the preceding three months. 
ǂ Not all percentages add up to 100 percent due to rounding.  
* No p-values were significant after correction for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni comparisons)  
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Processing mode manipulation check  
Results of a paired samples t-test revealed, as anticipated, the abstract condition produced more causal 
words than the concrete condition t (115) = 2.03, p<.05, (abstract condition: M = 3.72, SD = 4.26, concrete 
condition: M = 1.83, SD = 1.56). Additionally, as expected, the concrete condition produced more sensory 
words than the abstract condition t (115) = -3.46, p<.001 (abstract condition: M = 3.07, SD = 3.28, concrete 
condition: M = 7.74, SD = 6.28).  
Processing mode condition and total number of intrusions 
The association between processing mode condition and the total number of intrusions across the six-
hour post-film period was examined using a GLM with a negative binomial link function. The total number 
of intrusive memories experienced in the abstract (M= 4.63, SD= 3.83) concrete (M=4.68, SD=1.02) and 
distraction condition (M=5.88, SD=5.04).  The difference in the total number of intrusions reported by 
participants in the abstract processing mode condition when compared with participants in the concrete and 
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number of intrusions reported by participants in the concrete processing condition when compared to the 
abstract and distraction conditions was not significant (B = .23, SE = 0.25, p = 0.36). Thus, hypothesis 1 was 
not supported. 
When the above GLM was re-run with the inclusion of key covariates (PHQ-9, PROMIS, PSWQ, 
ACS and PCL-derived diagnosis), neither abstract nor concrete processing mode condition were significant 
predictors of total intrusions across the six hour follow-up interval (all two-tailed p’s > 0.05) and none of the 
covariates were significant independent predictors of total intrusions (all two tailed p’s > 0.05). 
An additional GLM with a negative binomial link was run with the total number of sensory intrusive 
memories as the dependent variable and condition (processing mode or distraction) as the IV. The total 
number of sensory intrusive memories experienced in the abstract (M= 0.77, SD= 1.02) concrete (M=0.70, 
SD=0.97) and distraction condition (M=1.30, SD=1.36).  This revealed that the distraction condition was a 
significant predictor of total sensory intrusions across the six hour follow-up interval, such that participants 
in the distraction condition reported more intrusive sensory memories than participants in either rumination 
condition (B=.470, SE=.255, p=.065). 
Post-task trajectories of intrusions 
The results for the LCGA analyses are summarised in Table 2. The most optimal solution appeared 
to be three-classes on the basis that the lowest BIC value was for three classes (1666.14), the LMRLRT p-
value was significant for three, but not four classes, and a three class solution appeared to be relatively 
parsimonious. The distribution of the sample across the three classes based on their most likely class 
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Table 2. Incremental fit statistics and classification accuracy for latent class growth model for intrusion 




Loglikelihood AIC BIC BICssa Entropy LMRLRT LMRLRT p-
value 
1 -885.60 1775.19 1780.70 1774.38 - - - 
2 -829.06 1668.13 1681.90 1666.09 0.67 105.65 0.04 
3 -814.05 1644.11 1666.14 1640.85 0.63 28.05 0.07 
4 -806.99 1635.98 1666.27 1631.50 0.62 13.20 0.11 
5 -802.00 1631.99 1670.54 1626.29 0.67 9.34 <0.01 
6 -801.06 1636.11 1682.93 1629.19 0.65 6.22 0.04 
7 -801.00 1642.00 1697.07 1633.85 0.64 1.93 0.19 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; BICssa = Sample size adjusted 
BIC; LMRLRT = Low-Mendell Rubin Likelihood ratio test. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the trajectories of intrusions across the six-hour post film period for participants 
based on their most likely class membership. The trajectories of participants in each of three classes could be 
described as rapid remitters (class 1; n = 40), slow remitters (class 3; n = 36), and (relatively) intrusion free 
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Figure 3. Trajectory of Intrusions over 6 hours  
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A central question of the current study pertains to whether participants could be expected to show 
differing trajectories of intrusions in the post-film period according to their assigned processing mode 
condition (Hypothesis 2). Table 3 summarises the correspondence between participants’ processing mode 
assignment and their trajectory class membership. 
Table 3. Correspondence between participant processing mode allocation and trajectory class membership. 




15 (38.5%) 9 (23.1%) 15 (38.5%)  39 (100%) 
Concrete processing 
condition 
15 (40.5%) 11 (29.7%) 11 (29.7%)  37 (100%) 
Distraction condition 10 (25.0%) 16 (40.0%) 14 (35.0%)  40 (100%) 
      
Total 40 (34.5%) 36 (31.0%) 40 (34.5%)  116 (100%) 
 
Multinomial regression analyses were then conducted to determine whether assigned processing 
mode was a significant predictor of trajectory class membership. Multinomial regression is an extension of 
logistic regression analysis for cases where the dependent variable is multicategorical (with more than two 
categories), consistent with the multicategorical nature of the estimated number of trajectory classes. Neither 
membership of the abstract processing mode condition (compared with either concrete or distraction), nor 
the concrete processing mode condition (compared with either abstract or distraction), were significantly 
associated with trajectory class membership (two-tailed p’s > 0.05). In other words, processing mode did not 
predict whether a person was a member of the rapid remitter, slow remitter, or intrusion free trajectory 
classes. 
Finally, we repeated the above multinomial regressions, but also included depressive symptoms 
(PHQ-9), anxiety symptoms (PROMIS), rumination (ACS), worry (PSWQ) and likely PTSD diagnosis 
(PCL diagnosis). The results are summarised in Table 4. None of these conceptually relevant covariates 
were significantly associated with post-film trajectory class membership (all two-tailed p-values > 0.05) 
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Table 4. Multinomial regression analysis predicting trajectory class membership. 
1. Rapid remitters (1) vs slow remitters (0) 
    95% CI for Exp(B) 
  B (SE) Exp(B) Lower Upper 
 Intercept 0.92 (1.95) - - - 
 PHQ-9 -0.09 (0.09) 0.92 0.77 1.09 
 PROMIS 0.02 (0.06) 1.02 0.90 1.15 
 ACS 0.15 (0.16) 1.16 0.84 1.60 
 PSWQ 0.00 (0.02) 1.00 0.96 1.03 
 Abstract processing mode -1.07 (0.61) 0.34 0.10 1.14 
 Concrete processing mode -0.73 (0.58) 0.48 0.15 1.49 
 Distraction processing mode (reference 
group) 
- - - - 
 PCL diagnosis -0.27 (0.56) 0.76 0.25 2.28 
 No PCL diagnosis (reference group) - - - - 
2. Intrusion free (1) vs slow remitters (0) 
    95% CI for Exp(B) 
  B (SE) Exp(B) Lower Upper 
 Intercept 0.31 (2.01) - - - 
 PHQ-9 0.10 (0.09) 1.11 0.94 1.31 
 PROMIS -0.06 (0.07) 0.94 0.82 1.07 
 ACS 0.19 (0.16) 1.21 0.88 1.67 
 PSWQ 0.00 (0.02) 1.00 0.96 1.03 
 Abstract processing mode -0.86 (0.59) 0.15 0.13 1.35 
 Concrete processing mode -0.11 (0.58) 0.90 0.29 2.81 
 Distraction processing mode (reference 
group) 
- - - - 
 PCL diagnosis 0.29 (0.58) 1.34 0.43 4.16 
 No PCL diagnosis (reference group) - - - - 
ACS = Action and Control Scale – Preoccupation subscale; CI = Confidence Interval; PCL = Posttraumatic 
Symptom Checklist-5; PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire – 9; PROMIS = Patient-Reported Outcomes 
Measurement Information System – Emotional distress Anxiety Short Form. 
 
Discussion  
The aim of the present study was to determine whether the trajectory of intrusive memories varies by 
ruminative processing mode over six hours following exposure to a negative mood induction.  It was firstly 
hypothesised that participants in the abstract condition would report more intrusive memories in total for the 
duration of the study compared to the participants in the concrete condition. Contrary to predictions, no 
difference was found in the total number of intrusive memories between participants in the abstract or 
concrete condition. In contrast, participants in the distraction condition, which was intended as a control, 
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reported more intrusive memories than either ruminative condition. This effect was only observed with 
respect to sensory, in contrast to verbal intrusive memories.  
Our findings do not support those of previous studies which have found that abstract processing 
leads to increased intrusion formation than concrete processing (Watkins, 2004; Ehring & Ehlers, 2008; 
Maria et al., 2012; Scaich et al., 2013; White & Wild, 2016). In contrast, our findings accord with those of 
Williams and Moulds (2007) that mode of processing does not influence intrusion formation. This 
discrepancy may be attributed to methodological differences, including the use of self-referent intrusions 
(Watkins, 2004; White & Wild, 2016, Maria et al., 2012), or mood inductions which were highly graphic 
(Scaich et al., 2013). Additionally, the processing mode induction was arguably stronger in previous studies 
which administered essays at multiple time points and provided participants with training, practice and 
feedback in their assigned processing mode (Watkins 2004, White & Wild, 2016).  
With regard to comparisons between distraction and the rumination-related processing modes, 
Ehring, Szeimies and Schaffrick (2009) was the only study to our knowledge that also included a distraction 
control group. Interestingly, this study also found that distraction lead to increased intrusive memory 
frequency in comparison to either abstract or concrete rumination. However, it is unclear whether the 
participants in the Ehring et al. study were instructed to report only sensory intrusions or those 
encompassing verbal and sensory characteristics. One explanation may be that the distraction condition 
served as a form of thought suppression, which has been shown to have the paradoxical rebound effect of 
causing upsetting memories to intrude more frequently (Dalgleish& Yiend, 2006). This may indicate that 
any form of processing of an emotional event, even rumination which has been viewed as maladaptive 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), may be more beneficial than no processing at all. 
An alternative explanation for the present findings is that rumination prevented individuals in both 
the abstract or concrete condition from immediately experiencing intrusive memories. It has been theorised 
that verbal-linguistic behaviour, such as rumination, dampens the refreshing function of imagery, causing 
images to disappear from awareness at a faster rate (Borkovec, Alcaine & Behar, 2004). Thus it is 
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conceivable that in contrast to individuals in the distraction condition, the rumination elicited in the abstract 
or concrete conditions temporarily interfered with the formation of intrusive images about the film. This 
explanation is consistent with results from a series of experiments conducted by Holmes and Colleagues 
(2008) which found that increases in verbal processing led to a reduction in intrusions following a trauma 
film paradigm.  
Rumination is nevertheless linked with greater levels of distress and intrusive memory frequency in 
the months following emotional events (Ehring et al., 2009; Zetsche et al., 2009, Slofstra et al., 2017). This 
disparity may be reconciled by the proposition that while rumination may temporarily dampen intrusion 
frequency during encoding or the immediate aftermath of an event, it may perpetuate intrusions in the long 
term. By switching attention from imagery to rumination (a verbal-linguistic activity), individuals suppress 
autonomic arousal, which may negatively reinforce this behaviour. This may lead to the predominance of 
rumination as a maladaptive avoidance strategy for distressing internal stimuli (including emotions, 
memories and unpleasant physical sensations).  
In the long term rumination may have a paradoxical effect of increasing intrusive memories if it 
prevents successful contextualisation and elaboration of memories (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Persistently 
elevated intrusive memories may undermine one’s perceived ability to cope and contribute to 
psychopathology (Hayes et al., 2013). Thus while both rumination conditions may have temporarily reduced 
intrusion frequency, this may have resulted in a delayed reaction whereby intrusions spiked after the six-
hour assessment period. This explanation is plausible given that studies which have found an effect of 
rumination on intrusive memories did so one to seven days after experimental manipulations (Watkins, 
2004, Maria et al., 2012, Scaich et al., 2013 and White & Wild, 2016). 
The second hypothesis, that processing mode may predict the trajectory of intrusions in the hours 
following the negative mood induction, was exploratory. The findings indicated that three classes of 
individuals best described the inter-individual course of intrusions across the six-hour post induction 
interval: rapid remitters, slow remitters and (relatively) intrusion-free. Interestingly, a “persistently high 
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frequency” class was not identified, indicating perhaps that individuals at risk of clinical disorders may still 
experience an erosion of intrusion frequency over time, but perhaps not as rapidly as other groups.  
Of particular note, is that processing mode was not predictive of trajectory class membership. Thus, 
while some studies have found processing mode to be predictive of intrusion frequency at specific time 
points following emotional events/mood inductions (Watkins 2004; White & Wild, 2016), processing mode 
does not appear to have value for predicting the course of intrusions across the immediate hours following 
an emotional event. Other variables may be better predictors of these trajectories, such as the activities 
which participants engage in during the post-induction period, with one speculative possibility being that 
cognitively taxing activities might contribute to a reduction in intrusions, albeit temporarily.  
In this regard, a strength of our study was that we conducted an ecological assessment of intrusions 
following the mood induction – when participants were returning to their routine daily activities. The 
trajectories of intrusions after leaving the lab may thus have been quite different to those if participants had 
remained in the relatively artificial testing environment.  
The present findings should be interpreted in light of several limitations. Firstly, despite use of the 
commonly used Nolen-Hoeksema distraction task (Williams & Moulds, 2007; Ehring, Szeimies & 
Schaffrick, 2009) it could be argued that differences in intrusion frequencies between this condition and the 
rumination conditions were a result of task differences. In contrast to the rumination conditions which 
involved essay writing, participants in the distraction condition were instructed to read and visualise items 
which may have inadvertently induced sensory processing, making individuals more susceptible to the 
formation of intrusive memories.   
Secondly, it is unclear whether participants in the distraction condition adhered to these instructions, 
or alternatively engaged in rumination about the film in their habitual processing mode. Finally, although 
illustrative, our sample was relatively small for a latent class trajectory analysis which may explain the less 
than optimal differentiation of classes (entropy 0.67). We nevertheless note that these approaches can be 
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used with sample sizes as small as 100, particularly when there are more than four within-subject assessment 
occasions (Nagin, 2005).  
Third, our manipulation of abstract processing emphasised a focus on the “general causes and 
general consequences” of the events of the film, rather than self-referential thinking, which is also 
conceptually related to rumination. However, we note that our manipulation appeared to successfully vary 
participants’ rumination in line with the key distinguishing features of abstract vs concrete processing, and 
that the manipulation was consistent with that of other researchers who have sought to induce these modes 
(e.g., Scaich, Watkins, & Ehring, 2013; White & Wild, 2016). Our manipulation check, as used by Watkins 
(2004), also identified the key discriminating differences between abstract and concrete processing modes 
(i.e., causal vs sensory content). Nevertheless, further studies might aim to induce and identify key aspects 
of self-referent processing styles as they pertain to rumination.  
Furthermore, while the present study focused on the implications of findings for depression, it is 
acknowledged that emotional responses evoked in response to our mood induction may also overlap with 
trauma responses (i.e. fear or horror). This overlap is mirrored in the complex emotional reactions to 
distressing events in real life, as is reflected in the rates of high comorbidity between depression and PTSD 
(Flory & Yehuda, 2015).  
Future studies should include measures of sensory and verbal processing and experiential avoidance 
to confirm whether it is verbal-linguistic nature of rumination which precludes successful emotional 
processing as reflected by the persistence of intrusive memories. Additionally, these variables should be 
examined in the months following naturally occurring distressing events to clarify the relationship between 
these processes and isolate the most relevant variables involved in the maintenance of intrusive memories 
and development of depression. Such investigation may point towards areas of intervention to treat intrusive 
memories and rumination, such as imagery rescripting procedures whereby the focus of the intrusive 
memory is processed and updated (Brewin et al., 2009).  
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Conclusions 
The findings of our study highlight the complex pattern of associations between processing modes 
and intrusive memories. While concrete and abstract processing modes were indistinguishable in their 
association with subsequent intrusions, engagement in rumination may provide a temporary benefit when 
compared to distraction for the experience of sensory intrusions in the hours following an upsetting event. 
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to chart different trajectories of intrusions that 
individuals might experience during the post mood-induction phased. Further research should aim to 
confirm these trajectory classes and identify reliable predictors of the course of post-induction intrusions. 
Likewise, there is a need to further clarify the extent to which sensory compared with verbal processing 
modalities bear upon intrusions. Addressing these questions will likely contribute to enhanced psychological 
therapy interventions for depressed individuals, as well as for people who have recently experienced 
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